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During his first four years in office, Presi- 
dent Reagan has been an active reformer of 
the structure of  American federalism. In the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1981, the 
President achieved a sweeping reform of the 
nation's system of  categoricalgrants to state 
and local governments, consolidating many of 
these programs into block grants and reduc- 
ing overall funding levels. 
A second major Reagan initiative, a "swap" 
in which the federal government was to take 
complete responsibility for Medicaid (which 
provides medical care for the poor) in exchange 
for the states' pledge to take over Aid to Fam- 
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food 
stamps, failed to win the approval of  state 
and local leaders and has been shelved. 
Now the Reagan administration proposes to 
further trim federal assistance to state and 
local governments by deleting the general 
revenue sharing program from its latest bud- 
get. Even if  supporters manage to continue 
funding for one more year, the program's future 
is highly uncertain, since its authorizing leg- 
islation expires on September 30, 1986. 
The evaluation of  such a sweeping reform 
calls for detailed knowledge of  the workings of 
the recipient governments. To answer the 
questions of  the efficiency, equity, and politi- 
cal acceptability of  this proposal, a model of 
local expenditure decision-making is required. 
Fortunately, there is a rich literature in eco- 
nomics on the effect of  lump-sum, general- 
purpose aid on local spending; the  question has 
become a focal point for the theoretical anal- 
ysis of  local public choice, shaping investiga- 
tors' viewpoints on larger questions about the 
nature and efficiency of  the local public sector. 
The empirical results in this field, how- 
ever, pose a serious challenge to the generally 
accepted models of  10 to 20 years ago, and have 
broken down rather than built consensus 
among economists. Thus, existing literature 
offers no unified framework from which to 
judge the Reagan proposal. 
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abstracting from 
any considerations 
as to the relative 
permanence of these 
different kinds of 
income. If a wage 
gain is considered 
apermanent increase 
in income, while a 
capital gain is con- 
sidered transitory, 
this will affect the 
consumer's savings- 
consumption decision 
and perhaps may 
affect the type of dur- 
able goods purchases 
that he will make. 
In this paper, I provide some theoretical 
background to the current public policy dis- 
cussion on revenue sharing. In section I, the 
nature of  the economists' previous consensus 
is explored, along with the empirical irregu- 
larities that broke down that consensus and 
invited new approaches to local public choice. 
Section I1 reviews the various ways in which 
economists have tried to amend or replace their 
previous notions in light of  these empirical 
results. Section I11 offers a critique of these 
efforts. A new model to explain these empiri- 
cal facts is summarized in section IV, along 
with a description of  an empirical test of  this 
model. The concluding section contains a few 
preliminary comments on the public policy 
ramifications of  this new model. 
I. Flypaper Effects 
Two approaches have dominated the literature 
on modeling local public expenditure deci- 
sions. The first approach, exemplified in the 
work of  Henderson (1968), Inman (1971), Ehren- 
berg (1973), Gramlich and Galper (1973), and 
Deacon (1978), applies standard consumer 
theory to this sector. Without specifying either 
the actors in the local decision-making pro- 
cess or their preferences, local governments 
are assumed to behave as if  they are maxi- 
mizing a well-behaved utility function over 
public and private goods, subject to a budget 
constraint that the total income of  the com- 
munity (intergovernmental grants as well as 
private income) must not exceed the total 
amount spent on private spending and local 
public goods. 
Although it is seldom made clear in these 
studies, this approach implicitly assumes that 
the city's budget is under the control of  some 
individual or party within the city, since a 
well-behaved utility function for the commu- 
nity will not exist unless this is the case 
(Arrow 1950). Subject to certain legal limits 
on the type of  taxes collected, this controlling 
party determines the type and quantity of  local 
public goods produced and the total amounts 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
spent in the public and private sectors of 
the economy. 
Remarkably, even this very unrestrictive 
approach, in which the identity of  the control- 
ling party is left unspecified, carries implica- 
tions for local expenditure behavior that are 
I  inconsistent with the empirical work in this 
field. Since the controlling party can tax local 
private income at will, this model acts as if  all 
intergovernmental aid, as well as all private 
income, were under the control of  this anon- 
ymous decisionmaker. Just as the choice for a 
consumer between new furniture or a new 
car is independent of  the composition of  income 
between wages, capital gains, dividends, and 
interest, so the controlling party's division of 
resources between private consumption and 
public goods should be independent of  whether 
the community's money comes from private 
income or from intergovernmental aid? If  all 
that concerns the city is to maximize some 
utility function over private consumption 
and public services, the source of  the money 
used to pay for the city's budget is irrelevant. 
Therefore, the expenditure effect of  a one- 
dollar increase in revenue sharing ought to 
be the same as that resulting from a one-dollar 
increase in aggregate private income in the 
community. 
In his review of  the early econometric work 
on this question, Gramlich (1977) noted that 
this equivalence was consistently rejected by 
the data. "Whether half or all the revenue- 
sharing money goes into higher expenditures, 
however, at this point all empirical studies 
indicate long-run responses appreciably greater 
than would be implied by the response of  expen- 
ditures to changes in income .  . ."  (Gramlich 
[1977], p. 230). This pattern of  behavior has 
come to be known as the flypaper effect: money 
originally from the public sector (intergov- 
ernmental grants) sticks in the public sector 
and is spent on public goods, while money 
originally from the private sector (local taxes 
on private income) sticks in that sector and 
is spent on private consumption. 
The  second major approach to modeling 
local public expenditure decisions retains the 
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ifies the identity and preferences of  the con- 
trolling party. Early writers in the theory of 
voting (see Hotelling [1929], Bowen [1943], and 
Black [1948]),  showed that whenever binary 
choice is involved (two political parties, two 
candidates, or two sides of  an issue), a position 
at the median of  the community's preferred 
spending levels will generate the greatest elec- 
toral support. This result ensures that com- 
petitive political processes will always produce 
median outcomes. Drawing on this theoretical 
foundation, numerous empirical studies have 
utilized the assumption that local governments 
behave as if  they were maximizing the utility 
of  the median voter in each community (see 
Bergstrom and Goodman [1973], Borcherding 
and Deacon [1972], Ladd [1975], Love11 [1977], 
Perkins [1977], Inman [1978], and Pack and 
Pack [1978]). Under further assumptions 
about the demand function for local public 
goods and the distribution of  income and wealth 
in the community, the income and the tax 
Fig. 1  Aid in the Median Voter Model 
Equivalence of  a Lump-Sum Grant of  Amount A 
to an Income Increase of  Amount TA 
-  Public 
A  expenditures 
price facing the median voter can be calculated, 
and the response of  individuals to changes in 
their public and private good budget constraint 
can be estimated. 
Even before this approach was well devel- 
oped, however, Bradford and Oates (1971) 
showed that it did not explain flypaper effects. 
They made their argument with the help of 
a simple graph, reproduced here as figure 1. 
The median voter's budget constraint between 
private goods and public expenditures is dis- 
played, with a slope equal to the negative of 
the median voter's tax share (here labeled T). 
A lump-sum,  general-purpose grant of  amount A 
(which I will refer to later as simply a lump- 
sum grant) shifts out the budget constraint in 
parallel fashion. Since the budget constraint 
is a straight line, an income increase of  amount 
TA  ought to generate the same final budget 
constraint as under the aid increase, and hence 
the same equilibrium amounts of  private goods 
and public expenditures. Thus, under the 
median voter model, an income increase of 
amount TA  is equivalent to an aid increase 
of  amount A. 
Another way to think about this result is 
to note that the median voter controls a share 
of the lump-sum aid equal to TA. Since the 
median voter is the dominant actor in local 
politics, he or she can move this bundle of 
resources in and out of  the public sector as 
desired. If, for example, the median voter 
decides to use none of  the lump-sum aid for 
public expenditures, the money would be used 
to lower taxes and the median voter would 
receive a rebate in the amount TA. Under the 
median voter model then, the voter's "public 
income" (TA) can simply be added to his or 
her private income (Y) to derive the total 
income (2): 
I  I 
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It follows that under the median voter model 
an increase in the median voter's share of 
lump-sum aid (TA ) ought to have the same 
expenditure effect as an increase in his or her 
private income (Y). 
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Study  Predicted by theory  Estimated  Error a 
Total local government 
expenditures 
Gramlich-Galper (1973)  0.03 I  dE/dA I  0.05  dE/dA  = 0.25  $0.20 - $0.22 
0.06 I  dE/dA I  0.10  dE/dA  = 0.43  0.33 - 0.37 
I  Inman (1971)b  0.02 I dE/dA I 0.04  dE/dA  = 1.00  0.96 - 0.98  1 
Ehrenberg (1973)b 
Study  Predicted by theory  Estimated  Errora 
Education 
Feldstein (1975)b  0  I  EE,~  I  0.05  EE,A = 0.21  0.16 - 0.21 
0  I  EEVA I 0.05  EE,A = 0.06  0.01 - 0.06 
Inman (1971)b  0  5 EE,~  I 0.06  EE.A = 0.71  0.65 - 0.71 
Inman (1978)  0  I  EE,~  I 0.06 
and 
0  I  EE,~  I 0.08 
EE,A = 0.23  0.15 - 0.34 
and 
EE,A = 0.40 
I Olsen (1972)b  0.02 I dE/dA I 0.04  dE/dA  = 0.27  $0.23 - $0.25  ( 
Weicher (1972)b  0  I  dE/dA I 0.001  0.41 I dE/dA I  0.58  $0.41 - 0.58 
Gramlich-Galper (1973)  0.01 1  dE/dA I  0.02  dE/dA  = 0.10  $0.08  - 0.09 
I Johnson (1979)b  0.004 I dE/dA I  0.006  0.38 5 dE/dA I  1.61 
$0.37 -  I 
a.  Reported in cents per dollar of  grant for studies measuring marginal effects and in points for studies measuring elasticities. 
b.  These works do not appear in this article's reference list. They can be found in Inman (1979) and Fisher (1982). 
SOURCE: Used with permission from Fisher (1982). For references, see Inman (1979) and Fisher (1982). 
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expenditure effects of  income. The second 
column displays the actual effect of  aid on 
expenditures, while the last column shows 
the discrepancy between the actual and pre- 
dicted effects. 
In the case of  studies reporting marginal 
effects, the expenditure effect of  lump-sum aid 
ranged from $0.20 to $1.60 larger than pre- 
dicted by the theory. For those studies report- 
ing elasticities, the expenditure effects were 
from zero to 71 percent larger than expected. 
As table 1 makes clear, although these effects 
are not ubiquitous (see, for example, Gram- 
lich [1982]), the vast majority of  studies sup- 
port the idea that flypaper effects are signif- 
icant and in need of  explanation. Moreover, 
flypaper effects results occurred across a wide 
variety of  data sets and empirical methodolo- 
gies, as discussed below. 
11. Previous Explanations 
of  the Flypaper Effect 
In examining the theoretical literature on 
flypaper effects, I begin with six conservative 
approaches. These six explanations, while 
modifying the theory briefly outlined above, 
retain the assumption that local expenditure 
decisions can be modeled as the choice of  a 
single, rational decisionmaker such as the 
median voter. These studies blame flypaper 
effects on misinformation, arguing 1) that pre- 
vious investigators have missed salient fea- 
tures of  the problem in modeling the response 
of  communities to grants-in-aid, or 2) that 
the median voter himself is mistaken about 
the effects of  grants on his budget constraint. 
Chernick (1979) and Fisher (1979) assert 
that previous analysts have classified much 
government aid as lump-sum although it 
does not properly belong in that category. 
Chernick notes that, if  lump-sum aid is con- 
strued to include project grants, this money 
may represent the outcome of  utility-maxi- 
mizing decisions by the bureaucratic agency 
that administers the program. This creates 
two problems in estimating the effect of 
aid on expenditures. 
First, the process of  awarding grants appears 
to be influenced by the number and dollar 
amount of  previous grant applications, so 
that actions of  the community influence the 
amount of  grants it receives. If  these grant 
applications are correlated with community 
expenditures, a simultaneous equations bias 
exists in which expenditures affect aid and 
aid affects expenditures. 
Second, in a more fundamental argument, 
Chernick says that grant determination is 
a complex process that involves the bureau- 
crat's utility benefit from additional expen- 
ditures in that community and the commu- 
nity's willingness to share in the costs of  the 
new project. Therefore, both grant amounts 
and local expenditures are endogenous vari- 
ables in the model; they are not related by any 
consistent function that can be compared to 
the effect of  income on expenditure. Depending 
upon the level and rates of  change of  the truly 
exogenous variables in the model, any com- 
bination of  grant and local expenditure levels 
can occur. 
Fisher argues that, when lump-sum aid in- 
cludes revenue sharing, the frequent inclusion 
of  tax-effort factors into the distribution for- 
mula for this money creates what amounts to 
a price effect as well as an income effect on 
local government spending. A community's 
tax effort is usually defined as the compound 
fraction formed by taking the ratio of  the 
community's tax revenue, divided by its tax 
base, to the tax revenue of  the entire nation or 
state, divided by the tax base of  this larger 
political unit. 
When such a factor is included in a revenue- 
sharing formula, it creates an incentive for 
local governments to raise taxes and expendi- 
tures in order to raise their tax effort and re- 
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ment. In other words, the price of  another unit 
of  expenditure by the community is reduced 
by the effect of  this spending on its tax effort 
and revenue-sharing collections. Because of 
this price effect, Fisher argues, we ought not 
to expect revenue sharing to have the same 
effect as an equivalent amount of  private 
income. 
In a related but more complex argument, 
Moffitt (1984) examines the role of  closed-end 
matching grants on the budget constraint of 
the median voter. In many cases, these grants 
have been considered lump-sum aid on the 
grounds that, once the program's upper limit 
has been achieved, the cost of  each additional 
unit of  the good is unaffected by the grant. 
This effect is shown in figure 2, which 
depicts the median voter's budget constraint 
with and without the program. When the 
community's expenditures are supplemented 
by the program, the slope of  the voter's bud- 
get constraint is -T(1-m), where m is the fed- 
eral government's matching rate, up to some 




E*  Public 
expenditures  I 
I 
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limit E*. Above that level of  expenditures, 
the grant amount remains unchanged, and 
I  the slope reverts to -T (as in figure 1). For any 
community locating between B and C, the 
budget constraint is shifted by the program, 
but its slope remains the same. 
Moffitt argues that when the budget con- 
straint becomes nonlinear, estimation becomes 
much more complicated and previous tech- 
niques yield biased results. For example, sup- 
pose that the functional form used in esti- 
mation implies a preference function that 
includes indifference curve I,,  but that com- 
munities have diverse preferences so that 
median voters in some cities have indifference 
curve Il.  Then the variation in preferences will 
be picked up by the error term. Notice, how- 
ever, that the change in preferences implies a 
change in the equilibrium price faced by the 
voter so that the error term and the price 
variable are correlated. This contemporane- 
ous correlation will lead to bias in the esti- 
mated coefficients. Moffitt also presents sug- 
gestive evidence (using a more sophisticated 
estimating technique, but employing an ad hoc 
demand equation to test for flypaper effects) 
that, in the case of  AFDC grants, flypaper 
effects disappear when these nonlinearities 
are accounted for. 
Hamilton (1983) believes that previous ana- 
lysts were fooled because they failed to realize 
that,  in many cases, private income represents 
both a pool of  resources for consumption and 
a surrogate for certain unobserved factors 
in the production of  local public goods. His case 
is strongest with respect to local education: 
not only does increased income in a community 
make possible increased spending on schools, 
but educational studies show that children 
from families with higher income and educa- 
tional levels tend to learn more rapidly than 
other children. Thus, as income increases, 
expenditure increases may be held down by 
the fact that children from higher-income 
homes require fewer educational resources to 
achieve a given level of  educational achieve- 
ment. This effect will again cause lump-sum 
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noted that Oates' 
model includes a 
budget-maximizing 
bureaucrat, and in 
that sense his model 
replaces rather than 
reforms the stan- 
dard median voter 
model. Howevel; the 
bureaucrat in this 
model derives his 
power solely from the 
voterk mispercep- 
tion of the marginal 
cost of local public 
goods. For that rea- 
son, I have included 
it in this section. 
aid to have a greater expenditure effect than 
income increases. 
Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) 
and Oates (1979) argue that it is the voter, and 
not the analyst, who is being fooled by the 
effect of  intergovernmental grants2  Specific- 
ally, since the typical voter has little informa- 
tion about the extent of  grants to his com- 
munity, the  voter estimates the unknown mar- 
ginal cost of  public goods using other known 
variables. By taking the ratio of  his tax pay- 
ments to total expenditures in the  community, 
the voter can determine the average cost of 
public goods and use this as  an  approximation 
for their marginal cost. When lump-sum aid 
is present, however, the use of  this proxy will 
cause the voter to err in his estimate of  mar- 
ginal cost. If  the lump-sum aid is used to 
finance additional expenditures, total expen- 
diture will increase while the median voter's 
tax payments will remain unchanged, thus 
driving down the average price of  public goods 
and leading the voter to mistakenly demand 
more public goods. Because of  this "fiscal illu- 
sion:'  these writers argue, lump-sum aid has 
a price as well as  an income effect and we 
should not expect the aid to have an expen- 
diture impact that is equivalent to the effect 
of  an income increase. 
In contrast to these six arguments, Romer 
and Rosenthal(1980) and Filimon, Romer, and 
Rosenthal(1982) insist that a more radical 
revision of  the model is needed to  explain fly- 
paper effects. In these papers, the authors 
remove the median voter from his preeminent 
position in local decision-making and replace 
him with a bilateral monopoly model in which 
both the voter and a budget-maximizing 
bureaucracy are  important actors. Flypaper 
effects occur, they say, because of  the influ- 
ence of  this bureaucracy. This  influence springs 
from the agencies' superior knowledge as  com- 
pared to that of  the median voter and/or the 
bureaucrats' ability to control the agenda 
of  the decision-making process. 
The "asymmetric information" model pre- 
sented in Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal is 
straightforward: the median voter is simply 
A Primer on Aid Types 
Intergovernmental aid can be classified according to 
two criteria. The first involves restrictions placed on 
the recipient government about how the money is to be 
used. The second way of  classifying aid is by determin- 
ing how closely the amount of  aid is tied to the recipi- 
ent's expenditures. Grants are usually identified ac- 
cording to their positions along these two dimensions. 
At one end of  the spectrum of  restrictions placed on 
recipient governments are categoricalgrants, which can 
be used only for a single, well-defined purpose. Federal 
grants for highways are of  this type. Many categorical 
grants are of  the projectgrants type, in which money is 
awarded for a specific undertaking (usually a capital 
project) at the discretion of  the federal agency admin- 
istering the program. Urban development action grants 
fit under this category. Somewhat less restrictive are 
blockgrants, which allow state and local governments 
to use aid for a broad class of  activities. Examples in- 
clude the federal government's community develop- 
ment block grant, social service block grant, and ele- 
mentary and secondary education block grant. At  the 
other end of  this spectrum lies general  purpose aid, 
which can be used for whatever the recipient govern- 
ment wants, including lowering taxes. Revenue shar- 
ing is an example of  general purpose aid. 
Along the second dimension, matching  aid requires 
that the recipient government spend its own money as 
well as funds from grants on  the aided goods. Typi- 
cally, as in the aid to families with dependent children 
(AFDC) program, this takes the form of  a cost-sharing 
arrangement; the federal government pays a percen- 
tage of  program costs. Matching aid can be closed- or 
open-ended, depending upon whether the grantor gov- 
ernment sets a ceiling upon the amount each recipient 
can receive (closed-ended),  or if  aid is available at the 
matching rate for whatever level of  expenditures the 
recipient chooses (open-ended). At the opposite end of 
this dimension of  grants is lump-sum aid, which is 
entirely independent of  the expenditures of  the recipi- 
ent government. Revenue sharing is typically catego- 
rized as lump-sum aid, although strictly speaking it 
has some features of  a matchinggrant if  tax effort con- 
siderations are used in distributing these funds (see 
text). In this paper, the term lump-sum aid has also 
been used as shorthand for the more cumbersome term 
lump-sum, general purpose aid. 
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his community (even its impact on the aver- 
age price of  public goods) and the well-informed 
bureaucrat simply uses all the lump-sum aid 
for additional expenditures. 
The "agenda control" model presented in 
both Romer and Rosenthal and in Filimon, 
Romer, and Rosenthal is more complex and 
more specialized. This model deals only with 
the case in which voters approve or disapprove 
local expenditures through a referendum, a 
situation which is not uncommon in local 
education. If  the school board's request is not 
approved (and subsequent proposals are also 
turned down by the voters) the school district's 
expenditure will be set to a "reversion" level 
of  spending, which is usually mandated by 
the state. The bureaucrat's power in this sit- 
uation springs from his ability to determine 
what proposal, if  any, is brought before the 
voters, who must choose between the board's 
request and the reversion level. For high rever- 
sion levels, the bureaucrat will bring forth no 
budget at all and will allow the state's rever- 
sion level to take effect. For very low (and 
hence unattractive to voters) reversion levels, 
the bureaucrat will propose the largest bud- 
get which will give the voter the same utility 
as the reversion level. 
The comparative statics of  this model are 
quite complex and depend critically upon the 
relationship of  the reversion level of  spending to 
the median voter's preferred level of  spending. 
Under certain circumstances, however, the 
model will generate flypaper effects. Suppose 
for example that the reversion level is very 
large so that the bureaucrat simply accepts the 
reversion level. Then increases in income will 
have no effect on expenditures since it is the 
exogenous reversion level, not voter prefer- 
ences, that determines spending. On the other 
hand, since most states require that aid be 
included in the reversion level, an  increase 
in lump-sum aid increases spending by the full 
amount of  the grant. 
Thus, in this stylized example, a flypaper 
effect equal to the amount of  the grant will 
occur (based upon the expenditure effect 
of  income, the grant should have no effect on 
expenditure, but expenditure increases equal 
to the grant are observed). In other situations, 
in which the reversion is less than, or in the 
neighborhood of, the median voter's preferred 
level, flypaper and even anti-flypaper effects 
(income generating larger expenditure effects 
than grants) can occur, depending upon the 
nature of  the voter's preference map. 
111. A Critique of  Previous 
Explanations 
The  explanations outlined above offer only lim- 
ited descriptions of  the flypaper effect that 
are confined to particular institutional situa- 
tions, to particular kinds of  grants, or to partic- 
ular government services. 
For example, Hamilton develops his argu- 
ment that income is a proxy for inputs into the 
production of  local public goods in a general 
way, but is able to offer examples only for local 
education and police protection. Romer and 
Rosenthal's "agenda control" model applies 
only to the case of  local direct (not represen- 
tative) democracy. Chernick's work applies only 
to project grants, not revenue sharing. Fish- 
erS arguments apply only to revenue sharing 
that is distributed according to a tax effort 
formula. Moffitt's model is relevant only for 
closed-end grants, particularly those with 
more than one matching rate (such as AFDC) 
where the applicable rate depends upon the 
community's expenditures. 
In a more subtle way, the fiscal illusion model 
and the "asymmetric information" model of 
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal are also lim- 
ited; without further modification, they are con- 
fined to the institution of  direct democracy. 
In these models, voters are misinformed about 
the fiscal situation facing their community 
and so make incorrect choices. But voters are 
typically represented by elected officials who 
know the extent of  aid to their communities 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
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might continue to 
have some relevance 
because most states 
do have a program 
ofrevenuesharingor 
grants for general 
relief, although these 
programs are usu- 
ally small in dollar 
value. Some of these 
programs include 
effort considerations. 
(it is a prominent part of  each annual budget) 
and who therefore know that marginal costs 
are unchanged by lump-sum aid. Moreover, 
since the decisions made by the  voter in the fis- 
cal illusion and asymmetric information mod- 
els will be suboptimal, elected officials will 
have a political incentive (in order to maxi- 
mize their chances of  reelection) to both act 
on this information about the true  cost of  pub- 
lic goods and to release it to the  general public. 
For example, if  voters would be happier 
with a smaller public sector and a reduction 
in local taxes, ambitious politicans have an 
incentive to give it to them. Thus,  in a rep- 
resentative democracy, these models require 
one of  two unpalatable modifications: either 
elected officials ignore even the most basic 
elements of  their city's financial situation or 
political competition in the  city has completely 
broken down. 
The limited scope of  these explanations 
contrasts sharply with the comprehensive na- 
ture of  flypaper effects, which appear across 
a wide range of  data sets, local public goods, 
and empirical methodologies. This means that, 
for every explanation given above, a study 
can be found that is beyond the scope of  that 
argument but that still finds evidence of 
flypaper effects. 
For example, Hamilton's hypothesis about 
income as an input leads to the conclusion 
that flypaper effects should occur primarily 
in education and public safety, but Gramlich 
and Galper (1973) report flypaper effects for 
social services (health and hospitals, and hous- 
ing) and urban support (sewers, sanitation, 
highways, and parks and recreation) as well, 
while Inman (1971) reports additional flypaper 
effects for sanitation, sewers, parks and rec- 
reation, transportation, libraries, and welfare. 
These two studies also carefully separate 
project grants  from their lump-sum aid variable 
to obviate Chernick's arguments about the 
2xogenous nature of  project grants. In a simi- 
lar way, ~yckoff  (1984) removes all categori- 
:a1  grants of  any kind from his lump-sum aid 
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variable, thus ensuring that the arguments 
of  Moffitt do not apply. 
Since the subject of  all the studies in table 1 
was representative democracy, none of  the 
arguments that rest on direct democracy 
(Romer and Rosenthal's agenda control model; 
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal's asymmetric 
information model; and the fiscal illusion 
model) are applicable. In addition, Fisher's 
tax effort considerations are probably not rel- 
evant to these results,  since those studies took 
place before the onset of  federal general reve- 
nue sharing and/or involved independent 
school districts that do not receive federal 
revenue sharing money? 
It is perfectly possible that flypaper effects 
are due to a combination of  the theories just 
discussed, with each explanation being more 
important in a particular place and time. If 
this were the case, however, we might expect 
more variation as to the presence or absence 
of  flypaper effects across empirical studies 
than illustrated in table 1. Without a unifying 
theory, we are forced to conclude that 10 out 
of  the 11  studies in table 1 happened by chance 
to choose data sets and empirical techniques 
that led, through many distinct mechanisms, 
to flypaper effects. 
While this multiple-cause explanation cer- 
tainly cannot be ruled out, table 1 at least 
suggests that a more general explanation of 
flypaper effects might be useful, one which is 
not tied to a particular public service, insti- 
tutional situation, or empirical specification. 
If  such a theory existed, it would be easy to 
explain the consistencies noted in that table. 
For this reason, the next section summarizes a 
new attempt to explain flypaper effects, based 
on institutional features of  government that, 
it is hoped, are more universal than the  factors 
that underlie the explanations given above. 
IV. A New Theory of 
Flypaper Effects 
Wyckoff (1985) details a new model of  fly- 
paper effects, based upon two basic ideas. 
First, local public goods are produced by pub- 
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do not always match those of  the community. 
Second, this bureaucracy has influence over 
city council because it knows more about the 
true cost of producing public goods than the 
council does. Because of  his or her profes- 
sional training and day-to-day contact with 
these matters, the head of  each department is 
assumed to have an advantage over council 
members in knowing both the production func- 
tion for public goods (what inputs are needed 
for a particular level of  output) and the min- 
imum cost for these inputs. 
To highlight the influence of  these two no- 
tions, the model uses three simplifying assump- 
tions. Local decision-making is assumed to be 
a simple two-way struggle between city coun- 
cil and a single, well-informed bureaucrat. 
Due to political competition, the preferences 
of  city council are taken to accurately reflect 
those of  the median voter in each community. 
Following Niskanen (1971), the bureaucrat 
is assumed to be solely interested in increasing 
the size of  his budget, because this budget is 
systematically related to variables of  direct 
interest to him: salary, fringe benefits, profes- 
sional prestige, and power over others. Use of 
this third assumption means that the result- 
ing model is an application and extension of 
Niskanen's model. 
According to the public choice literature on 
bureaucracy, the bureaucrat's information 
advantage has an effect on public expendi- 
ture, allowing him to expand the city's bud- 
get beyond what the median voter would pre- 
fer. To increase his budget, the bureaucrat 
submits the largest request he thinks council 
will approve. In reviewing this request, city 
council is hampered by its lack of  knowledge of 
the effects of  marginal changes in the budget; 
since it doesn't know the true cost of  public 
goods, it doesn't know what budget changes 
will mean in terms of  changes in output. A 
risk-averse city council will therefore tend 
to avoid making changes in the bureau's bud- 
get request. 
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Moreover, an  expansion-oriented bureaucrat 
will compound the council's timidity in mak- 
ing budget changes by acting strategically. Not 
only does the bureaucrat have no incentive 
to reveal correct information about the true 
cost of  public goods, he will try to release dis- 
torted information and respond to budget cuts 
by cutting the most popular programs first 
("cutting the meat instead of  the fat"). Another 
budget-increasing tactic is to respond to coun- 
cil's tendency to cut all budget requests by a 
certain proportion by inflating requests so as to 
maintain desired spending levels even after 
allowance is made for token budget-cutting. 
By using his information advantage this way, 
the bureaucrat in this simplified model will 
push the city council to the point where the 
median voter is indifferent between the bud- 
get that is finally approved and doing without 
the local public services (and the taxes that 
go to pay for them) entirely. This  is a standard 
proposition of  the Niskanen model. However, 
the local government case differs fundamen- 
tally from the central government case (the 
subject of  Niskanen's study) because city res- 
idents have a stronger "exit" option (to use 
Hirschman's [I9701  term) than do citizens of  a 
nation. If  he becomes dissatisfied with his 
community, the voter can always move. 
Two standard comparative static results from 
the Niskanen model carry over to the model 
in Wyckoff (1985). First, the community's 
demand function for public goods, as filtered 
by negotiation with bureaucrats, will always 
be cost-elastic. Second, a dollar of  lump-sum 
aid to this community will always generate 
more than a dollar of  additional expenditures 
(for proofs of  these two propositions, see 
Wyckoff [1984]). 
Since it is set in the local context, however, 
the model has additional consequences that 
explain flypaper effects. The intuition behind 
these results is that the median voter's bar- 
gaining position with respect to the bureau- 
crat is not the same when he gets lump-sum 
aid as when he receives an increase in his 
private income. 
When the voter receives an increase in pri- 
vate income, he can use this extra income 
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alternative city he moves to. The increase in 
the income (and hence the utility) of  the voter's 
next best alternative is of  prime importance 
for the model: this effect leads to greater credi- 
bility in the voter's threat to leave if  the bureau- 
crat goes too far. An increase in the value of 
the voter's alternative helps constrain the 
bureaucrat's demands and reduces the equi- 
librium size of  the community's budget. 
An increase in lump-sum aid, by contrast, 
improves the  voter's current circumstances but 
cannot be moved to a new location with the 
voter-it is tied to his current city. Hence there 
is no corresponding increase in the value of 
the voter's threat to move in the case of  an 
increase in intergovernmental aid. It is this 
asymmetry in bargaining position that creates 
flypaper effects. 
The situation facing city council and the 
bureaucrat is similar to that facing the man- 
agement of  a company and its labor union. 
During labor negotiations, the wages and work- 
ing conditions that are  eventually agreed upon 
depend not only on current circumstances, 
but on each side's alternative situation if  an 
agreement is not reached. For example, if  man- 
agement can creditably assert that it does 
not really need the plant due to, say, the pos- 
sibility of  filling orders from overseas pro- 
duction, then the perceived value of  its next 
best alternative will be high, and it will be 
able to more effectively restrain the wage 
demands of  the union. 
To continue this analogy, consider man- 
agement's bargaining position with respect to 
the union in two situations: 1) an increase 
in profitability in this one plant due to a reduc- 
tion in the local price of materials; and 2) an 
increase in the profitability in the entire com- 
pany due to a worldwide increase in demand 
for the product. 
The former situation, which parallels the 
effect of  lump-sum aid in the case of  local 
governments, improves management's profit 
picture in the current situation (with this plant 
open) but not in any other situation (overseas 
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,  supply). The latter situation, which is anal- 
ogous to the effect of  private income on local 
decision-making, increases management's 
profits in current as well as in alternative 
production schemes. Because management's 
threat to move production overseas is more 
credible in the latter situation than the for- 
mer, workers will demand higher wage in- 
creases when the profit increase is localized 
to their own plant. 
This new model of  flypaper effects was tested 
using 1977 expenditure data from 115 small 
cities in Michigan. Using a single-equation, 
double-logarithmic functional form, expendi- 
ture was regressed on to population, the median 
voter's tax share, total income (2  = Y + TA  ), 
the share of  total income from lump-sum aid 
( TA/Z), non-revenue-sharing aid, and several 
additional demographic variables. 
In testing this bureaucratic model against the 
standard median voter model, a joint hypoth- 
esis test involving two coefficients was em- 
ployed. First, the coefficient on population 
was included because of  population's role in 
influencing the cost to the median voter of  local 
public goods. Since the model retains the pri- 
macy of  the median voter visi-vis  other citi- 
zens in the local decision-making process (so 
that the preferences of  other voters don't mat- 
ter), if the median voter's tax share is held 
constant, the only effect of  increasing popula- 
tion in a community is crowding of  public 
facilities. If  public goods are defined in terms 
of the resources available to each individual 
resident (for example, park space per capita), 
then, ceteris paribus, this crowding raises 
the cost of providing a uniform level of  these 
goods to the median voter. 
Second, the coefficient on the share of  income 
from lump-sum aid was also utilized to test 
for the presence or absence of  flypaper effects. 
If  flypaper effects are absent, the composi- 
tion of  the median voter's income between 
private income and aid should have no effect 
on expenditures; the coefficient should be 
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the restriction under 
the Niskanen model 
that a one dollar 
increase in lump- 
sum aid generates 
more than a one dol- 
lar increase in  expen- 
ditures, this hypoth- 
esis applies only to 
total (current plus 
capital) expenditures. 
It may be worth not- 
ing, howeve6 that 
the data appeared to 
fulfill this restric- 
tion of  the model. 
Evaluated at sample 
medians, a one dol- 
lar increase in un- 
restricted aid gener- 
atedan extra 56cents 
of current expendi- 
tures and an  increase 
of  75  cents in capi- 
tal spending, for a 
total increase of 
$1.31. 
5. The observa- 
tions of  Nathan, 
Manuel, and Cal- 
kins, however, do 
not by  themselves 
constitute an expla- 
nation of flypaper 
effects. Although they 
explain why revenue- 
sharingmoney might 
be  used for capital 
rather than operat- 
ing expenditures, 
their arguments fail 
to show why the 
money is not used to 
reduce local taxes- 
why does the money 
stick in the public 
sector? If city coun- 
cils are in charge of 
the budget and are 
responsive to the 
voters, this should 
not happen. 
zero. If  flypaper effects are present, expendi- 
tures should increase with the share of  total 
income coming from lump-sum aid. 
Thus, under the bureaucratic model, de- 
mand must be cost-elastic and the coefficient 
of  population on total expenditures must be 
negative. In addition, the coefficient on the 
share of  income from lump-sum grants must 
be positive, reflecting flypaper effects. By con- 
trast, under the median voter model, there is 
no restriction at all on the population coeffi- 
cient, but the coefficient on TA/Z must be zero. 
The regressions contained in Wyckoff (1985) 
show that, when operating expenditures only 
are the dependent variable, the bureaucratic 
model is rejected by the data, while the median 
voter model is not rejected. When capital expen- 
ditures are employed, the opposite is true: 
the median voter model is rejected by the  data, 
but the bureaucratic model is not rejected? 
The results suggest that a dichotomy exists 
with respect to local governments' operating 
and capital expenditures: the bureaucrat has a 
great deal of  influence on the latter and not 
much on the former. This is not an implau- 
sible result, since in the real world city coun- 
cils may not be as helpless as portrayed in the 
simplified model above. Council members can 
often employ monitoring devices that, although 
costly in terms of  time or money, yield infor- 
mation about bureau performance and the true 
costs of  producing public goods. For example, 
strict budgeting and expense reporting tech- 
niques may be used, cost and output data can 
be compared with those of  other communi- 
ties, and feedback from citizens and the news 
media can be cultivated. It is entirely possible 
that these monitoring devices work well in 
one context but not in another. The  complex- 
ity of  capital expenditures, along with their 
ability to be financed by debt, may make it 
easier for the bureaucrat to press his demands 
there rather than in operating expenditures. 
In addition, as pointed out by Nathan, 
Manvel, and Caulkins (1975), city councils 
may be more willing to accede to the bureau- 
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crat's demands in the capital expense area 
because of  a fear that revenue-sharing money 
might eventually be cut off  by the federal 
government. Rather than using revenue shar- 
ing to fund new operating expenditures, which 
would have to be funded by increased taxes 
if  revenue sharing was discontinued, local gov- 
ernments often chose to channel the revenue 
sharing money into one-time capital projects 
such as highway and sewer repairs? 
Moreover, the dichotomy of  spending pat- 
terns between capital and operating expendi- 
tures observed in these cities suggests that 
the bureaucratic model may prove superior to 
the other explanations of  flypaper effects dis- 
cussed above, although no empirical tests of 
this hypothesis were undertaken. None of 
these previously mentioned theories suggest 
such a dichotomy. In fact, differences between 
current and capital expenditures are wholly 
inconsistent with many of  these models. For 
example, if  flypaper effects are caused by fiscal 
illusion, the voter ought to be fooled for both 
kinds of  expenditures. If, on the other hand, 
fiscal effort provisions in revenue sharing are 
causing flypaper effects, these effects ought 
to show up in both capital and operating expen- 
ditures. And, finally, if  bureaucrats are able 
to hide grants from voters, this should be regis- 
tered in both types of  spending. 
V.  Conclusions 
The previous discussion ought to establish one 
important point: any evaluation of  proposals 
to change the current system will be strongly 
influenced by our model of  how the local pub- 
lic sector works. For example, proponents 
of  the Reagan cutbacks have argued that reduc- 
tions in aid to state and local government will 
be offset by the increases in state-and-local- 
government-taxable private income that results 
when tax and deficit burdens on the economy 
are reduced. Suppose for the sake of  argu- 
ment that private income does increase just 
enough so that, in the absence of  flypaper 
effects, local expenditure in each community 
would be unchanged. If  we accept the argu- 
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flypaper effects are due to the peculiarities 
of  project grants and closed-end matching 
grants, the proposed cuts in revenue sharing 
(which does not share these unique features) 
will indeed be balanced by an appropriate 
increase in private income. According to the 
arguments of  Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal, of 
Romer and Rosenthal, and of  Wyckoff, how- 
ever, flypaper effects are endemic to the local 
decision-making process, and it would take 
very large increases in private income to off- 
set the spending cuts caused by the loss of  the 
revenue-sharing program. 
The model of  Hamilton, on the other hand, 
implies a subtle and interesting position on 
this question. Flypaper effects do occur, he 
acknowledges, and we ought to expect that the 
substitution of  private income for intergov- 
ernmental aid will reduce total state and local 
government expenditure, but we ought not to 
conclude from this that the total output of 
the local public sector has declined. If  income 
enters the local production function for pub- 
lic goods, then, even if  purchased inputs 
(which is what is measured by the local bud- 
get) have declined, the  increase in income may 
increase the (unmeasured) output of  local 
public goods in the community. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the model in Wyckoff 
does not have unambiguous public policy impli- 
cations with regard to economic efficiency. 
Despite the bureaucrat's expansion of  the 
local budget, the model does not show that 
the local .public sector is either productively 
or allocatively inefficient in a welfare sense. 
Because the effective demand function for 
local public goods is always cost-elastic, the 
bureaucrat can only maximize his budget by 
operating at minimum cost, and hence there is 
no productive inefficiency (see Wyckoff [1984]). 
And although the budget is larger than the 
median voter would like, there is no reason to 
presume that what the median voter desires 
is allocatively efficient. In fact, two studies 
have argued that, if the median voter model 
Economic Review  IIQ:1985 
is operating in the local public sector, the 
output of  that sector is probably suboptimal 
(see Barlow [I9701  and Bergstrom and Good- 
man [1973]). 
The model does have predictions about the 
likely effects of  a repeal of  the revenue-sharing 
program and the political dimensions of  such 
a move. First, as noted above, we ought to 
expect large cutbacks in state and local expen- 
ditures because of this change. Second, the 
chief opponents of  such a cutback would not 
necessarily be the citizens of  each state and 
local government, since the satisfaction of  the 
median voter in each community is determined 
not by the amount of  aid received by his or 
her state or local government, but by the util- 
ity of  the voter's next best alternative com- 
munity. The  aid raises local expenditure levels 
without increasing his satisfaction with his 
current community. This result may help ex- 
plain both the widespread discontent of  citi- 
zens with state and local governments and 
the fact that the chief proponents of  aid pro- 
grams are often the employees and managers 
of  these governments. 
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